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ABSTRACT
The unique identities of every mobile user (phone number,
IMSI) and device (IMEI) are far from secure and are increas-
ingly vulnerable to a variety of network-level threats. The
exceedingly high reliance on the weak SIM authentication
layer does not present any notion of end-to-end security for
mobile users. We propose the design and implementation of
Secure Mobile Identities (SMI), a repetitive key-exchange
protocol that uses this weak SIM authentication as a foun-
dation to enable mobile users to establish stronger identity
authenticity. The security guarantees of SMI are directly re-
liant on the mobility of users and are further enhanced by
external trusted entities providing trusted location signatures
(e.g. trusted GPS, NFC synchronization points). In this pa-
per, we demonstrate the efficacy of our protocol using an im-
plementation and analysis across standard mobility models.
We also demonstrate how the SMI abstraction can enable
new forms of secure mobile applications, including messag-
ing, multimedia transfer and a marketplace.
1. INTRODUCTION
Existing authentication standards adopted by GSM
cellular providers provide no notion of end-to-end trust.
This is inherently due to the GSM authentication pro-
tocol, which is asymmetric in that it does not require
the network to identify itself - exposing mobile devices
to various network-level security vulnerabilities. Adver-
saries can launch different forms of Man-in-the-Middle
(MitM) attacks [38] including message interception, mod-
ification, eavesdropping, spoofing and phishing. The re-
cent proliferation in attacks on GSM security [54, 47,
23] has been exacerbated by the widespread availabil-
ity of software-defined cellular platforms like OpenBTS
[9] powered by USRP nodes [13], sysmoBTS [12], Fair-
waves [2] and Opencell [10]. Application level secu-
rity solutions typically rely on simple password based
user authentication coupled with SSL/TLS [53], both
of which are fraught with significant problems. Surpris-
ingly, many transactions in the mobile landscape are
performed through applications written such that SSL
is not always enabled [57]. A recent survey by Fire-
Eye on the 1000 most downloaded free applications on
the Google Play Store showed that of the 614 applica-
tions that use SSL/TLS to communicate with a remote
server, 448 (73%) do not check certificates [3].
We aim to address the following question: Can we
build a secure key framework that enables mobile devices
to establish an end-to-end trustworthy channel with other
mobile devices, or a cloud service provider? In this pa-
per, we present the design and implementation of Se-
cure Mobile Identities (SMI), an identity authentication
mechanism that enables mobile devices to convert their
weak SIM identity to a stronger self-certifying identity.
Establishing such a secure identity for every mobile de-
vice significantly enhances user and application security,
especially for cloud-hosted applications that rely on the
identity of the mobile device as an alternate trust chan-
nel (e.g. 2-factor authentication [40, 56]).
While there have been numerous efforts to enhance
the security of mobile devices at different levels, none
of these results focus on building a strong end-to-end
trust model around the unique identity of mobile de-
vices. Most existing solutions have predominantly fo-
cused on either the lower level to secure the wireless
channel [30, 18] or the higher level to protect user iden-
tities and applications [6, 31, 40], while others have fo-
cused on protecting the mobile device itself [26]. SMI is
built upon the pragmatic assumption that the Mobile
Network Operator (MNO) 1is trustworthy, but the un-
derlying cellular channel may not be. The SMI setup
models for a local network-level adversary whose aim
is to hijack this cellular channel and launch a variety
of attacks. Using knowledge of this threat model, the
basic building block to establish end-to-end trust be-
tween a pair of mobile devices is the probabilistic one-
way trust channel abstraction offered by MNOs. More
precisely: At a given time t, if a mobile device with a
unique identity Di is genuinely connected to its MNO O
and is weakly authenticated (using SIM authentication)
by it; and if any arbitrary sender sends a control mes-
sage M addressed to Di which successfully reaches O’s
network; then M is correctly delivered to the device Di
with high probability. The delivery (and consequently
1Used interchangeably with Cellular Network Provider
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security) guarantees are probabilistic in that successful
delivery is dependent on the premise that the channel
to Di is not subject to MitM threats at time t.
The SMI protocol involves repetitive key-exchanges
using this probabilistic one-way trust channel. Devices
can exchange their keys using a challenge-response pro-
tocol from a varied set of locations at different times,
providing spatio-temporal diversity. SMI enables a mo-
bile device (or cloud) to build sufficient trust in the key
of another device using a reputation mechanism; higher
the user mobility, larger the diversity and hence greater
the trust on the corresponding (identity, key) pair. Ad-
ditionally, we describe how a variant of SMI can quickly
authenticate identities using third-party identity veri-
fication services for a pair of mobile devices, each of
whom consider the other a stranger.
In short, SMI is a mechanism for augmenting the
existing SIM security in a cheap and convenient man-
ner. Security guarantees of SMI can be significantly en-
hanced through the use of trusted locations. With mini-
mal infrastructural change, SMI can obtain such trusted
location information from a variety of sources. Specific
portions of the protocol can be implemented using alter-
native paths 2 which include WiFi access points, data
or other proximate physical synchronization points, in-
creasing protocol scalability. We demonstrate the ro-
bustness of SMI based on proof of concept testing of
secure applications on top of the SMI substrate and de-
tailed analysis of its security properties. In summary,
SMI provides a predominantly decentralized protocol to
build a strong and secure mobile identity with strong
end-to-end trust guarantees in the face of network-level
security threats.
2. SETUP AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we define the problem we set out to
solve, establish our assumptions and threat model. We
begin by briefly reviewing current GSM authentication
and how the SMI protocol augments it.
2.1 Motivation
Background: Subscribers of any MNO initially procure
a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) which has a unique
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and a
shared key required for authentication. The Authenti-
cation Center (AuC) of the MNO gains knowledge of
this key during SIM registration. The SIM and the
AuC use an unidirectional challenge-response protocol
to verify the shared key, and establishes a temporary
session key for the subscriber.
Threat Vectors: However, this asymmetric cellular au-
thentication layer is vulnerable to message interception,
phishing, eavesdropping and spoofing, among other threats.
2Used interchangeably with channel
One such threat is the use of fake base transceiver sta-
tions (fBTSs) to trick the device into connecting to an
adversarial (henceforth termed fake) network. Such at-
tacks are fairly easy to execute with the availability of
software defined radio platforms that can emulate cellu-
lar base (transceiver) station functionality [10, 9, 8, 13,
12, 2]. One possible attack involves the fBTSs exhibit-
ing greater signal strength than the real base station
to lure mobile subscribers during their first connection
to the cellular network. Another possible attack is to
selectively jam specific frequency bands in a local area
to force mobile devices to search for alternative base
stations, some of which could be fake.
Forcing a mobile device to connect to a fake net-
work exposes it to a myriad of network-level threats.
Meyer et al. [47] show a MitM attack on Universal Mo-
bile Telecommunications Systems (UMTS) by exploit-
ing the lack of integrity protection in the base stations.
Kostrzewa et al. [39] exploit weaknesses of the A5/2
[23] cipher to demonstrate another MitM attack. The
A3 and A8 algorithms used by cellular networks, specif-
ically COMP128 and COMP128-1, are known to have
flawed implementations which make it easier for net-
work adversaries to launch MitM attacks against [62].
Another attack is for the fBTS to use known ciphertext
attacks [22] to recover the session keys without disrupt-
ing the original subscriber authentication process [19].
Given physical access to a SIM card, there have been at-
tacks that can recover the shared key embedded in the
SIM through effective challenge-response mechanisms.
Extensions of these attacks have facilitated over-the-air
(OTA) cracking of shared keys [11, 46].
2.2 Problem Definition
SMI aims to establish an end-to-end secure channel
between a pair of mobile devices in a decentralized man-
ner. The problem can also be modified to build trust
between a mobile device and a cloud service provider.
Both problems require building upon the weak authen-
tication mechanism provided by cellular networks. To
elaborate further, consider mobile devices U1 and U2
with unique identities D1 and D2. U1 and U2 gen-
erate their own self-certifying 3 public keys PK1 and
PK2 and their corresponding private keys. Our goal
is to achieve secure key exchange between U1 and U2
in the face of network adversaries who may try to dis-
rupt this process. To state succinctly, U1 has to learn
the identity-key mapping (U2, PK2) and likewise for U2.
With SMI, we aim to achieve two properties:
Robustness of Key Establishment. A combina-
tion of user and device IDs creates a certified identity
as a consequence of repetitive spatio-temporally diverse
interactions. This identity requires substantial (compu-
tational and economic) expenditure to forge.
3Complete certification is achieved as trust grows
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Scalable Key Exchange. The protocol scales with
the number of participating users.
2.3 Adversary Model
Any user can be in the presence of a local network
adversary at a particular location. The adversary can
create an fBTS to monitor and alter any or all commu-
nication relayed through it [59]. With its devices, the
adversary can overhear, intercept, and inject any wire-
less communication. The adversary can also jam spe-
cific signal frequencies. We assume that there is reason-
able bootstrapping cost associated with setting up the
equipment. Hence, we assume that the adversaries are
not omnipresent with respect to the locations the user
moves to. For practical considerations, we assume that
the adversary will neither follow the user to more than k
locations, nor will follow any mobile user continuously.
We also assume that the adversary is computationally
bounded and would require reasonable amount of time
(at least few hours [27] to few days) to cryptographically
break the weak authentication layer of GSM. Therefore,
a new mobile subscriber who may immediately be sub-
ject to an attack by an adversary has sufficient time to
establish and partially prove its self-certifying identity,
unless it is subject to denial of service.
3. OVERVIEW
In this section, we present an overview of the SMI
protocol. We begin by discussing the assumptions re-
quired to support our protocol, followed by explanation
of the various components that constitute it. We base
our discussion on the case where pairs of mobile devices
authenticate their identities with respect to each other,
but similar arguments can be made for a mobile device
authenticating its identity to the cloud.
3.1 Assumptions
The SMS channel operates over the same control chan-
nel used for authenticating mobile subscribers. Given
the weak authentication mechanism currently in place,
the SMS channel can be viewed as a probabilistic one-
way trust (POWT) channel (as defined in §1). This
pragmatic assumption is critical to successful execution
of the protocol. We also make the following assump-
tions, which naturally lead to the construction of the
POWT channel assumption. First, we explicitly as-
sume that the cellular service provider and mobile de-
vice is trusted. The SMI protocol primarily deals with
network-level adversaries who aim to seize the cellular
channel to launch MitM attacks. Second, we assume
that the shared key present in the SIM issued by the
cellular provider is not compromised at the time of is-
sue. If adversaries have the capability to issue their own
pre-authenticated SIM cards, then the POWT channel
assumption does not hold. Third, we assume that SMS
is delivered with high probability as the network layer
inside a cellular network is not tapped or tampered in-
ternally, barring the last-hop where it is exposed.
3.2 Protocol Summary
The SMI protocol is a repetitive key-exchange that
utilizes user mobility across different locations and time
to incrementally establish trust over the POWT (SMS)
channel. For the adversary to achieve success, it (in the
form of an fBTS) has to be in the vicinity of the mobile
device (or cloud provider) at all times. Assisted by this
locality constraint placed on the adversary, successful
spatio-temporally diverse key-exchanges stipulates an
exponential decrease in the ability of an adversary to
spoof an (identity, key) pair. Each mobile device partic-
ipating in the SMI protocol computes a reputation score
for every mobile device that it exchanges keys with,
where the reputation grows with increased location di-
versity and number of exchanges. Similarly, the trusted
cloud provider builds a reputation of participating de-
vices based on the combination of their unique mobile
footprint and device identities using the key-exchange
protocol. The security guarantees of the SMI protocol
strengthen with increase in the reputation score.
Mobile To Mobile: To explain in detail, one user
termed the initiator calculates the reputation score of a
participant across discretized time intervals called epochs.
Successful key-exchanges, initiated both periodically and
aperiodically across an epoch comprise of trading a signed
digest (for verifying message integrity) and an encrypted
tuple (ensuring information privacy). The tuple con-
sists of spatial and temporal information coupled with
user and device identities. The reputation score is in-
creased when there is adequate diversity in location in-
formation and time. When the reputation score reaches
a predefined threshold, the identity of the participant
is authenticated with respect to the initiator.
Cloud To Mobile: This variant is an extension of the
previous case. The cloud provider both periodically and
aperiodically probes the mobile device for the informa-
tion tuples, across multiple epochs. Succesful probing
results in the growth of the reputation of the device in
the eyes of the provider. The key differences with the
earlier discussed variant stem from the fact that the
cloud provider is trusted, and does not require to prove
the mapping between its identity and the keys it uses. It
is also important to note that providers are often static
(or immobile), in safeguarded locations.
To maintain a healthy reputation score across each
epoch, messages specially tagged for the SMI protocol
are repeatedly exchanged in the background over the
SMS channel. Running in the background reduces the
amount of user intervention thereby increasing the us-
ability of the system.
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3.3 Spatial Diversity: Location Information
Mobility ensures that the required geo-diversity is ob-
tained for successful reputation growth. Mobility also
enables a user to potentially move outside the range of
an adversary. The other component required for spatial
diversity, location, has two major components, namely:
Untrusted Locations: This can be obtained from
various sources such as location sensors on mobile de-
vices, GPS, cell towers or other external sources (such
as an access point) but these locations, by definition are
non-certifying and are easy to forge [61].
Trusted Locations: Location information obtained
from the sources listed above can be modified or forged.
The security, and convergence time of the SMI protocol
can substantially improve using time-certifying trusted
locations. This certification by an accredited party in-
creases credibility of the location and hence contributes
greater towards the score calculation. The different
ways of obtaining trusted location information are:
• Trusted GPS Sensors: Phones could easily be em-
bedded with trusted GPS sensors with pre-certifying
keys that can provide time-certifying locations [55].
• Trusted Identity Verifier: Recent proliferation of
mobile payment systems such as Android Pay or
Apple Pay can be used to provide a signed time,
location contract.
• Trusted BTS: We envision that by imposing (mini-
mal) hardware changes using trusted co-processors
[64], location information from BTS’ can be used
to verify the location, even during handoff.
3.4 Temporal Diversity: Epochs
An epoch is a discrete, fixed-length time interval, usu-
ally in the order of hours. We select this specific dura-
tion of time as any adversary will require at least few
hours to break the weak GSM authentication. We de-
fine an interaction as user U1 sending a message to user
U2 (or provider P ), within an epoch. The duration of
each interaction is finite and upper bounded. Thus,
the number of interactions that can occur in an epoch
is also finite. An interaction is successful if it hasn’t
been interfered with by the adversary, through denial
of channel or interception. This measurable nature of
an interaction allows for revocation mechanisms in case
of failure. In an epoch, the initiator begins interactions
with other participants in both periodic and aperiodic
manners. This aperiodicity or random probing prevents
an adversary from using knowledge of protocol period-
icity for malicious intents. The reputation score is built
by successful interactions across multiple epochs. If a
user is inactive for more than half an epoch, successful
interactions in that particular epoch do not contribute
towards the calculation of the reputation score. Thus,
an epoch can either complete successfully or abort, with
no transient state in between.
3.5 Reputation Score
An important concept required for this score compu-
tation is that of a zone, which is defined to be a geo-
graphic region with a fixed boundary. A fundamental
assumption is movement between zones entails much
higher mobility than movement within a zone. The
reputation score can be computed as a linear combina-
tion of scores from various components, including: (i)
weights associated with both trusted and untrusted lo-
cations, (ii) third-party identity verifiers providing proofs
of identities, (iii) temporal diversity in key-exchanges,
and (iv) other meta-factors including node priority (de-
fined in §6). We believe that this formulation (discussed
in detail in §5) necessitates user mobility which reduces
the likelihood of an attack, and thereby increases the
credibility of a user’s identity. A threshold is chosen
based on the user’s mobility model, and frequency of ad-
versarial interference. In essence, this threshold should
ensure that the reputation of a user grows at a favorable
rate independent of moderate adversarial interference,
such that reaching the threshold implies that the user
has reasonably mitigated threats from an adversary.
4. KEY-EXCHANGE PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe the key steps in the SMI
key exchange protocol across epochs where pairs of mo-
bile users sign spatio-temporally diverse tuples of infor-
mation using self-generated, self-certifying key-pairs.
Three-Way Handshake: The basic building block
for SMI is a simple variant of the standard challenge-
response mechanism used to establish a connection be-
tween two participating entities. The initiator (U1)
and participant (U2) with corresponding device iden-
tities D1 and D2 generate key-pairs (PK1, QK1) and
(PK2, QK2) respectively. U1 and U2 exchange their
public keys PK1 and PK2 with a challenge-nonce c1
and a response-nonce c2 and corresponding signatures
S1(.) and S2(.). Each subsequent key-exchange is asso-
ciated with a (location, time) pair. These subsequent
three-way handshakes can be represented as:
1. U1 → U2 :fPK2(L1, t1, U1, D1, c1)
2. U2 → U1 :S2(c1), fPK1(L2, t2, U2, D2, c2, c1)
3. U1 → U2 :S1(c2), fPK2(c2)
where fPK1 and fPK2 represent standard public key
encryption function, and S1(.) is a standard signature.
Additionally, (L1, t1) and (L2, t2) represent location time
pairs. Issues raised by the rare event of message deliv-
ery failure can be resolved using standard retransmis-
sion techniques; delivery failure after certain number of
retransmissions results in abort for the epoch.
4.1 Using Untrusted Locations
In an epoch, a pair of devices consistently interact; at
the start of an epoch, the users create and exchange
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seeds which inter-link subsequent interactions within
the epoch. We label these seeds to be exchanged as
random parameters and refer to this stage of the proto-
col as the dialing phase. This is followed by a connection
phase where there is a repetitive exchange of keys with
varied (location, time) pairs.
To elaborate, each epoch begins with users U1, U2
generating random parameters a, b ∈ N respectively.
These parameters assist in ensuring consistent inter-
actions, defined to be a challenge-response mechanism
with the Markov property i.e. the response at any time
tm depends only on the interaction at time tm−1. Ad-
ditionally, for any particular epoch, all further interac-
tions between the users contain incremental signatures
where every signature in an interaction m builds upon
the signature in interaction m − 1. Random parame-
ters a and b are repetitively used as challenge-response
nonces for each such signature. After the dialing phase,
both users are familiar with both a and b. This is fol-
lowed by k two-way key exchanges, where at the 2ith
iteration, U1 sends a signature S2i(a||S2i−1(.), L2i, t2i)
and U2 responds with S2i+1(b||S2i(.), L2i+1, t2i+1), where
|| denotes concatenation. Hence all the signatures in an
epoch are connected and an adversary who has to dis-
rupt has to participate in an entire epoch, right from
its inception. The exact key exchange steps in an epoch
are outlined below. It is important to note that signa-
tures are indexed by the interaction number. All odd
numbered signatures in the dialing phase are generated
by user U1. However, in the connection phase, odd
numbered signatures are generated by user U2.
Dialing Phase:
1. U1 → U2 : fPK2(L1, t1, U1, D1, a)
2. U2 → U1 : S2(a), fPK1(L2, t2, U2, D2, b, a))
3. U1 → U2 : S3(b||a), fPK2(b)
Connection Phase:
For steps 4, 5; ∀ i : i = 2 to k + 1
4.1 U1 : S2i(.) = S2i(a||S2i−1(.), L2i, t2i)
4.2 U1 → U2 : S2i(.), fPK2(L2i, t2i, U1, D1, S2i)
5.1 U2 : S2i+1(.) = S2i+1(b||S2i(.), L2i+1, t2i+1)
5.2 U2 → U1 : S2i+1(.), fPK1(L2i+1, t2i+1, U2, D2, S2i+1)
6. If all k exchanges are successful
U1 : IncreaseRep(D2, PK2)
U2 : IncreaseRep(D1, PK1)
During the connection phase, each interaction be-
tween U1 and U2 is initiated both periodically and ape-
riodically. The former is done to ensure devices have
sufficient mobility; the latter to ensure randomness in
an epoch exchange, reducing any advantage an adver-
sary could have gained using the knowledge of period-
icity. The adversary can forge the identity of the ini-
tiator and randomly start another epoch, taking undue
advantage of this aperiodicity. We ensure that this is
avoided by sending a special tag at the end of the on-
going epoch with consistent interactions. The inception
of a new epoch will be approved by the participant only
on receiving this tag. An adversary attempting to de-
crypt the secure and consistent interaction between the
users at a time ti (i>0) would have to possess knowl-
edge of the random parameters which effectively serves
as an increment counter. The probability that the ad-
versary can correctly guess both parameters is very low
(≈ 1/|2N |2) where N is the number of bits in the key
space, making it practically impossible to disrupt the
epoch except forcing the mobile devices to abort the
epoch. Spoofed messages sent by the adversary are in-
consistent with the ongoing interactions and this alerts
the users of its presence in the communication channel.
Upon successful completion, both parties enhance their
reputation of the individual identities (IncreaseRep(.))
while an abort does not have a negative outcome.
4.2 Using Trusted Locations
The previous version of the protocol was specifically
for untrusted locations. In §3.3, we discussed differ-
ent types of third-party providers or physical interac-
tions that can provide a notion of trusted locations
with verifiable time-bound signatures. Consider one
such provider X who has an independent PKI rooted
infrastructure [34]. X has a wide distribution of trusted
device end-points where each device is embedded with
(a) key-pair generated by the root X, and (b) corre-
sponding trust certificate from the certificate root of
X. In addition, each device has a trusted GPS sen-
sor that provides the location L of that particular de-
vice. Thus, this donor device is equipped to provide a
trusted signature s(L, t) to any interacting device. This
signature also encompasses the trust certificate of the
donor from the root X. If one trusts the public key of
the root of X, then the location signature s(L, t) is a
verifiable proof. Except the case of trusted GPS sen-
sor within each mobile device, protocol participating
devices obtain these trusted location through physical
proximity-based interactions with the donor device. In
SMI, we impose that the integrity of this signature per-
sists over the time to live (TTL) window ∆i from the
moment it was exchanged (say ti) i.e. exchange i + 1
should be initiated at ti+1 such that ti+1 ≤ ti + ∆i.
Most mobile devices which connect to the genuine cel-
lular network receive time updates from the network;
hence an assumption about minimal time synchroniza-
tion errors across participating devices and trusted lo-
cation endpoints is pragmatic. Borrowing terminology
from §4, consider the following example of a three-way
handshake (dialing phase) between user U1 and trusted
third-party T , where ⇒ denotes communication using
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a close-proximity (eg. NFC) channel:
1. T ⇒ U : fPKU (s(LT , tT ), UT , DT , c1)
2. U → T : SU (c1), fPKT (LU , tU , UU , DU , c2, c1))
3.1. T → U : ST (c2)
3.2. T ⇒ U : fPKU (c2)
An alternative variant ensures that before providing
a trusted location signature s(LT , tT ) in step 1, the ex-
ternal location provider can perform an independent
three-way handshake with the mobile device in phys-
ical proximity to it, where the external trusted location
synchronization point uses the SMS channel to verify
the authenticity of the device identity DU . In other
words, the trusted location provider can use an inde-
pendent network interface to send the challenge over
the SMS channel instead of Bluetooth or NFC channel.
Thus, the trusted location provider verifies the interact-
ing device identity DU subject to the POWT Channel
assumption. An even stronger variant would be for the
location provider to provide s(DT , LT , ti) where it pro-
vides a device specific time-bound location signature.
4.3 Using Multiple Channels
Another simple, but extremely useful variant of the
key-exchange protocol is to leverage multiple commu-
nication channels during an epoch: SMS, data channel,
WiFi, Bluetooth etc. Though the SMS channel is in-
tegral for the POWT Channel assumption to hold, it
is severely inhibited by its 160 character limit. To par-
tially alleviate load on the SMS channel, we can use
alternative channels to offload non-critical data and use
it to only send the challenge-response information. One
cannot completely bypass the use of the SMS channel
for challenge or response messages since that is the only
channel that is directly connected to the identity of the
mobile device participating in the protocol. This vari-
ant of the protocol can help in significantly reducing the
number of SMS messages that we need to exchange to
establish trust with other devices.
4.4 Validation With The Cloud
This version of the protocol specifically discussed the
issue of bootstrapping trust with a cloud service provider
P . The key technical details, especially the random
probing component, remain the same; minor variations
arise due to the following reasons: (a) The cloud service
provider has a fixed location i.e. LP never changes (as in
§4.2). This location is often not disclosed to the public
to ensure secrecy, ergo providing better protection, (b)
The cloud service provider also has access to a cellular
channel with much larger bandwidth than conventional
cellular devices, partially mitigating any DoS attack at-
tempts, and (c) The cloud service provider is trusted.
It does not have to prove the authenticity of its (iden-
tity, key) mapping. It is pragmatic to assume that the
cloud is equipped to quickly deal with any infrastruc-
tural failures, and proactively defend threats against it.
Borrowing previously used terminology, the connection
phase of the protocol can be summarized as follows:
1. P 7−→ U : fPKU (.) = fPKU (s(LP , tP ), UP , DP )
2. U → P : SU (fPKU (.)), fPKP (LU , tU , UU , DU ))
3. P 7−→ U : fPKU (.) = fPKU (s(LP , tP ), UP , DP )
4. U → P : SU (fPKU (.)), fPKP (LU , tU , UU , DU ))
where 7−→ denotes a random probe by the cloud server.
This variant is particularly useful, when the cloud can
host an identity verifier (explained in §5.4). It is impor-
tant to note that across all the variants discussed, the
variable used to denote time, t, varies with each step.
5. REPUTATION
In this section, we further discuss the various com-
ponents associated with the reputation score. We also
discuss obtaining the threshold above which the identity
is considered to be reputed, the security guarantees we
provide and a quick mechanism to bootstrap reputation
using a trusted third-party identity verifier.
5.1 Reputation Score Formulation
To begin formalizing the reputation score in detail, let
the duration of epoch i be represented by [ti0, t
i
1] where
ti0 is the time at inception of epoch i and t
i
1 is time at
its conclusion. The score for user U at time t ∈ [ti0, ti1]
is given by:
RU(t, i) = γ.f1(t, i) + δ.f2(t)
• f1(t, i)=α.(m(t, i))+(1 − α).f1(ti−11 , i − 1); smoothing
factor α ∈ (0.5, 1) and i ≥ 1 such that
m(t, i)=c1.m1(t, i)+c2.m2(t, i); c2>c1>1, where (a)m1(t, i)
denotes the number of successful interactions in the
time interval [ti0, t] due to untrusted locations, and (b)
m2(t, i) denotes the number of successful interactions
with unique trusted locations in the same interval.
• f2(t) is a cumulative score associated with the total
number of proofs of identity from third-party identity
verifiers in the time period [t10, t] (explained in §5.4).
We set α ∈ (0.5, 1) to provide greater weightage to
current transactions compared to historical transactions.
We also set c2>c1 to provide greater credibility for trusted
locations over untrusted locations. The notion of unique
trusted locations provides verifiable proof of user mobil-
ity between these locations. Additionally, we view the
reputation contribution due to third-party identity veri-
fiers to be larger and hence, the contribution of function
f2 outweighs that of f1. This is enforced by constants
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δ>γ. The reputation score after q epochs, R = XU +YU
where:
XU = α.γ.
∑q
i=1[(1− α)q−i].m(ti1, i)
YU = δ.f2(t
q
1)
5.2 Management & Scheduling
The number of messages that a mobile device can
send is restricted because of cost factors and the net-
work load. Each device leverages the multiple channels
available at its disposal to reduce message overhead by
transmitting non-critical information using alternative
channels which are less constrained (in terms of content
size) than the SMS channel. Every device has an inbuilt
reputation manager that tracks the reputation of all the
user identities in the address book. Additionally, SMI
measures the frequency of interaction between users to
determine the importance level (priority) of users in the
contact list. Users can also pre-specify importance level
of other users in their contact list.
Scheduling: Based on the importance of a user, their
reputation score, and threshold, SMI uses a simple opti-
mization mechanism to determine an active list of recip-
ients with which SMI will enter into a new epoch of key-
exchanges. Given a limited message quota for a time pe-
riod (characterized by costs), the schedule optimization
mechanism orders messages based on the highest util-
ity metric of user priority i.e. important users are to be
bootstrapped faster. Once an initiator commences an
epoch, it makes sure that it gives precedence for all mes-
sage exchanges within the epoch even if it may slightly
over-run the specified message quota. The reputation
manager performs the important function of scheduling
to achieve the dual goals of reducing message costs and
maintaining the reputation levels of important mobile
users in the address book. Apart from minimizing cost,
this optimization provides an additional benefit of re-
ducing cellular network load whilst producing the same
guarantees with respect to security and score growth.
5.3 Security Guarantees
An adversary is bound by the following constraints
in the SMI protocol: First, any adversary that aims to
hijack an identity has to generate its own key-pair for
the identity. To be able to leverage the forged key-pair,
the network adversary has to be in continuous prox-
imity of the mobile device and completely prevent any
communication between the device and the cellular net-
work. This kind of adversarial behavior is severe and
assumed to be infrequent. Second, if the adversary aims
to hijack an identity before the device participates in
the SMI protocol, then the device can generate a con-
flicting self-certifying key (discussed in §8) which forces
the cellular network to abandon/reject the SIM used by
that device. Third, an adversary aiming to hijack any
epoch must obtain the random parameters exchanged
at the beginning of the epoch, an event that occurs with
very low probability. Outside of these options to hijack
the channel, the easier strategy for the adversary is to
jam specific exchanges in an epoch, enough to facilitate
epoch abortion. This may at best, delay the establish-
ment of a sufficient reputation score between an initia-
tor, participant pair. All these factors clearly indicate
the difficulties an adversary faces in disrupting the SMI
protocol over every epoch.
Consider a scenario where a network adversary dis-
rupts a particular channel with a small probability p.
Assuming no collusion between various adversaries, the
probability that the user’s communication is disrupted
across k locations (under the coverage of distinct cell
towers) is pk. The adversary controls a fraction of the
the cell towers (locations) that the user frequents. We
assume that even in the extreme case where the user fre-
quents all cellular towers (of size n) within a region, the
adversary can control upto half these towers i.e k ≤ n/2.
We also assume that the adversarial nodes are operating
in the always on mode, to immediately detect and hin-
der any user activity. The value of pk << 1 for larger
values of k. Thus, with increased mobility, we are able
to ensure that the adversarial interference is minimal
with high probability (assuming the adversary does not
actively follow the user).
However, human mobility patterns can be predicted
with high precision, and are often repetetive. The ad-
versary can utilize this historical knowledge to strate-
gically position his fBTS nodes to hinder user activity
most effectively. For example, the adversary may utilize
knowledge that the user is at work for nearly a quarter
of his day (nearly 6 hours), and place a node in the vicin-
ity. As explained earlier, the adversary can combine a
DoS attack and identity forgery to build reputation on
behalf of the user. However, since the adversary is (eco-
nomically) constrained to a few locations, the user is
notified of its presence once he is not within adversarial
proximity. To aleviate the degradation caused by the
adversary, the user is presented two options: (a) Slowly
build trust through alternate channels till he is out of
the vicinity of the adversary, and (b) Visit trusted third-
party verifiers (refer §5.4) to quickly bootstrap trust.
With each successful interaction in this period, the
reputation score of the participating users grow, build-
ing confidence in their identities. To account for rep-
utation decay and to maintain liveliness, nodes need
to periodically perform key-exchanges to preserve their
reputation above the threshold.
5.4 Third-Party Identity Verifiers
A third-party identity verifier represents a specific
variant of the SMI protocol where one of the end-points
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participating in the key-exchange protocol is not a mo-
bile device but a cloud-based service (such as Keybase,
Onename) that maintains reputation gained by a mobile
device. A third-party identity verifier can be thought
of as a simple datastore that maintains a history of all
prior interactions of a device. Any external cloud-based
entity can function as a third-party verifier and one can
imagine an ecosystem with multiple such verifiers. As
this third-party is trusted, a participating device can
quickly build its reputation utilizing (historical) infor-
mation contained. During key exchange, the verifier
randomly probes the honest user at different time peri-
ods to ensure that the user does not behave erroneously
under the influence of a network adversary.
We envision the following trusted third-party providers
to be used in the quick bootstrap process: (a) Cellular
Providers like AT&T, Sprint and Verizon; (b) Indepen-
dent third-parties like Verisign, Keybase and Onename;
(c) Trusted wallet providers like Google, Apple and
Mastercard. There are several important use-cases for
such third-party verifiers. First, each cellular network
can run their own instance of the verifier. This enables
the cellular network to quickly learn the self-certifying
key of its mobile users. With sufficient information,
the cellular network has essentially established a decen-
tralized PKI for all its mobile users. Consequently, this
enables the cellular network to quickly detect SIM cards
that may be subject to attacks by network-level adver-
saries as they present conflicting information. Second,
third-party verifiers who are popular and potentially
trustworthy can help a pair of mobile users to quickly
bootstrap trust between themselves. Finally, trusted
wallet providers can use the reputation score to create
a reliable mapping between wallet identities, user iden-
tities and secure mobile identities of devices of users.
6. REPUTATION SCORE EVALUATION
In this section, we discuss the various experiments
performed, our results for the same and conclude with
the key takeaways from our experiments.
6.1 Emulation Setup
We evaluate the SMI protocol across different mobil-
ity models, testing with traces generated by standard
mobility models [50, 45], namely:
Simple Traffic: Models vertical and horizontal mobility
patterns without direction changes.
Random Walk: Models unpredictable movement. It is
also referred to as Brownian Motion [35].
Probabilistic Random Walk: This model introduces user-
defined probabilistic direction changes.
Manhattan Mobility Model: Nodes move in horizontal
or vertical direction on an urban map. It employs a
probabilistic approach in the selection of movements.
Downtown Mobility Model: Adds traffic density to the
Manhattan model. Mobility is reduced in predefined
downtown areas, where the user is 70% of the time.
Test Ecosystem: Our setup comprises of several ini-
tiators and participants, totalling 104 nodes. The em-
ulation is run across a 1010 sq. meter (3861 sq. mile)
grid, roughly the size of Los Angeles County, Califor-
nia. In the context of our experimental setup, we define
zones to be 108 sq. meter (38.61 sq. mile) grids, totaling
102 different zones. In this setup, each of the 102 zones
have a unique distribution of trusted locations. The
mean speed chosen for mobility was 14 mph. This was
the weighted average value of the speed whilst moving
in a vehicle (25 mph) and whilst walking (3 mph), both
amidst moderate traffic density. The algorithm cho-
sen as part of the reputation manager is fixed-priority
preemptive scheduling [16]. Any interaction can abort
based on adversarial interception of the channel at the
location the initiator/participant is at. We set an epoch
to be 1 day in all our experiments, with messages ex-
changed at an hourly frequency. Therefore, 3 epochs
or nearly 70 exchanges increases the probability of suc-
cessful protocol completion to (1 − p)70. We observe
that the average reputation score increase per epoch is
1680. This produces a corresponding threshold of 5000
(1680 × 3). Some of the other parameters required to
compute the reputation score are explained below:
Priority: A manually entered value associated with
each participant which indicates its relative importance
on the initiator’s contact list. Priority ranges from 1
which is the smallest value to 10 which is the largest. As
per the scheduling algorithm chosen; in the vicinity of
any trusted location, the reputation score of the highest
priority nodes is increased.
Batch: A uniformly assigned value to each partic-
ipant creating disjoint participant sets. This ensures
that each disjoint set is entitled to score growth uni-
formly across the entire time interval independent of its
priority, thereby preventing stunted score growth. The
total number of batches is a function of the number of
contacts on the initiator’s device.
6.2 Composite Mobility Model
Due to the volume of data required for evaluation and
the difficulty in obtaining anonymized mobility traces,
we emulate our experiments using a composite mobility
model. This model postulates that the mobility model
of each node may change to one of two foreign mod-
els (Manhattan & Downtown Manhattan) at every six
hour interval during a day, but return to its home mo-
bility model (Simple Traffic) at the start of each day i.e.
between 00:00 hours and 06:00 hours, where the node
is assumed to be stationary (or mobile in a restricted
space). This composite mobility model draws insights
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from [37, 20, 58, 51] and we believe that this draws some
parallels with realistic mobility patterns as it attempts
to emulate habitual human mobility.
6.3 Results
Mobility Low Nil High
Model (p=0.28) (p=0) (p=0.54)
Simple Traffic 191 150.6 229.2
Prob. Random Walk 175 140 212.6
Random Walk 100.2 79.1 122.6
Manhattan Traffic 142 111.9 172.5
Downtown Manhattan 119 92.5 141.3
Table 1: Average Number Of Exchanges Re-
quired
1. Single Node Score Growth: To provide visual-
ization of the reputation score growth for a single node
with the composite mobility model, we plot two cases:
one in the absence and one in the presence of a severely
active adversary. Using a scaled down version of the
reputation manager (in terms of scoring), Figure 1 de-
notes the growth of the reputation for a node as a func-
tion of time, reaching a threshold of 1700. The baseline
case i.e. the absence of any adversarial interference or
trusted locations converges in 70 hours. The second sce-
nario where the node is in the presence of an adversary
43% of the time i.e. the (increased) adversarial inter-
ference (p) is 0.43. Thus, the node takes nearly double
the time (136 hours) to reach the same threshold. In
this extreme case where there is stunted growth of the
reputation score, the protocol succeeds only because of
score growth due to the trusted location distribution,
where 1 of every 12 locations visited is trusted.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
Time (x 0.33 hrs)
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
Re
pu
ta
tio
n 
Sc
or
e
Baseline
Reduced Interference
Increased Interference
Threshold
Figure 1: Reputation Score Growth
2. Number Of Exchanges: Table 1 reports the av-
erage number of exchanges (NOE) required to reach a
threshold of 3400 for each of the mobility models across
10 independent trials of the experiment and varied ad-
versarial interference, where a subset (of size 100) of
participants are assigned the same priority. The Simple
Traffic model has the largest NOE because participants
move in a fixed direction, thereby reducing the chances
of being in the vicinity of a trusted location frequently.
On the other hand, the rate of mobility in the Down-
town Manhattan model, while lower in some areas is
higher in others. Thus, with increased mobility, the
chances of being in the vicinity of a trusted location
also increases, thereby lowering the NOE.
3. Protocol Convergence: We emulated key-exchanges
at an hourly frequency for a period of 30 days, for all
104 nodes in our experimental setup. For all these ex-
periments, the threshold is set to 5000. We observe
that the time taken to successfully reach the predefined
threshold varies based on:
i. User Mobility: Figure 2(a) suggests that in the
baseline case, a very small fraction of total participat-
ing nodes (the bottom 0.0063 percentile) are immo-
bile. We vary the reputation threshold and observe
that the percentage of immobile users remains nearly
constant across all experiments. The mean convergence
time however, varies with the reputation threshold and
amount of adversarial interference. For visualization
purposes, we represent protocol failure using a conver-
gence time of 190 hours. We observe that nearly 20% of
participating nodes fail with the severity of interference.
Interference Convergence λ
Baseline 0 70 hrs 0
Reduced 0.11 79.37 hrs 0
Increased 0.39 89.05 hrs 25%
Table 2: Interference & Convergence
ii. Adversarial Interference: We performed two sets
of experiments, one with reduced adversarial interfer-
ence with a maximum probability of 0.28 and another
with increased adversarial interference of maximum prob-
ability 0.54. Note that even the maximum value of re-
duced interference is an overestimation of the actual
value as an attack of such scale would require expansive
economic resources. We sanction such (large) values to
display the endurance of our protocol. We emulated
400 trials of both experiments along with a baseline
case for better comparison. As expected, increased in-
terference affects a larger number of key-exchanges and
thus increases the protocol convergence time, sometimes
beyond 720 hours. This increases the percentage of fail-
ure (λ) among participating nodes. On the other hand,
reduced interference produces moderate delays towards
convergence. Table 2 and Figure 3 reflect our claims.
iii. Number of Trusted Locations: Across 400 trials
for a subset of users of size 102 in the baseline case,
we observed the impact of trusted locations towards
protocol convergence. We achieved this by plotting the
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Figure 2: Aggregate Statistics
average convergence time against the number of trusted
locations. Since the quick growth of reputation hinges
on an increased number of such locations or cloud-based
providers, we observe an expected direct correlation be-
tween the two parameters in Figure 2(b). The small
slope is due to the variation in trusted locations across
zones; some have greater densities than others, and due
to repeatedly visiting the same trusted location in a
predefined window (of size 2 days in our experiments)
disregarding the constraint for unique trusted locations.
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Figure 3: Convergence vs Adversarial Interference
iv. Priority & Batch of Participating Nodes: The
large scale emulation for 104 nodes with reduced ad-
versarial interference (p=0.28) was segregated and the
convergence time was visualized as a function of the pri-
ority of the nodes. Since the reputation manager em-
ploys fixed priority scheduling, the protocol convergence
time is inversely proportional to the priority of the par-
ticipating nodes as in Figure 2(c). Outliers may exist
in this plot because of two reasons, one being a cyclic-
batch-wise score update module we have implemented
as part of the reputation manager. This module ensures
that no subset of nodes is starved for score updates due
its reduced priority. The other reason is a module that
reduces the maximum priority used as part of trusted-
location based score increments. This reduction is done
in a cyclic fashion in a periodic manner. However, these
outliers have been normalized due to repeating this ex-
periment 400 times to account for sufficient randomness
in batch, priority across nodes and adversarial interfer-
ence, number of trusted locations across the emulation
test-bed. By increasing the contribution due to trusted
locations module, we can further increase the slope.
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Figure 4: Quick Reputation Bootstrap
v. Quick Reputation Bootstrap: To emulate this phe-
nomena (explained in §5.4), we computed the reputa-
tion score with the trusted third-party and without (i.e.
baseline case) but increased the key-exchange frequency
to 40 minutes. This frequency increase increases the
baseline convergence because the average mobility (ra-
tio of distance actually covered to the distance that can
be covered) of nodes is lesser at a 0.67 hour frequency
when compared to an hourly frequency. From Figure 4,
we observe that the quick reputation bootstrap is faster
by a factor of 80, from 84 hours to 1 hour, highlight-
ing its impact towards score growth. This decrease by
nearly 1.9 orders of magnitude is non-trivial, but comes
with an implicit caveat. Staleness of the information at
the third-party provider should be carefully measured.
7. APPLICATIONS
Our implementation of the SMI protocol is on top
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of the Android platform. The devices used in our im-
plementation were Samsung Galaxy Young (GT-S5360)
phones with Android v2.3.6. Standard APIs such as
Bouncy Castle Java cryptography were used for crypto-
graphic operations, with a key length of 2048 bits. Our
implementation emulates physical synchronization with
a trusted location using Bluetooth.
Secure Messaging: We have implemented a version
of secure messaging on Android. On building sufficient
reputation, the user can send signed messages to (a se-
lected subset of) its contacts. This application has a
SMS receiver component, which filters messages having
a SMI header. Based on experiments conducted, we
observe that the average time taken to send messages
over the Etisalat network is 12.88 seconds per message
especially since encrypted messages will be split across
several messages due to the signature length. The ac-
tual cryptographic operations consumed less than 0.06
seconds or 0.4% of the total time on a mobile device.
Secure Image Transfer: We first generate a shared
AES key and then encrypt the image using it, and trans-
fer the encrypted image over the data channel. Given
that a direct data path between mobile devices may
not exist, we use an online cloud server as a synchro-
nization point and exchange the data through it. The
encrypted version of the shared key and proof of the file
is shared over the SMS channel. This proof is a simple
one-way hash of the byte-array of the image generated
using SHA-1. On receiving the message, the recipient
fetches the encrypted image, decrypts the AES key and
then the image, and verifies the one-way hash proof.
Based on experiments, we observe that the average time
taken for the image transfer application is 27.65 seconds
out of which an average time of 20.42 seconds was taken
to upload the image. This extended period of time for
upload is due to asymmetry in bandwidth provided.
Secure Transactions: We developed an encrypted
marketplace where mobile users share their keys using
SMI. Then, using an online server as a synchronization
point for a marketplace server, participants could place
encrypted buy/sell orders. In essence, the central server
is unaware of the exact transactions but enables a group
of users to execute peer-to-peer transactions securely.
The participants obtain three guarantees using SMI: (a)
SMI establishes authenticity of the keys of the individ-
ual participants; (b) Every order placed in the market-
place was signed by the corresponding buyer or seller
which enabled transaction-level trust between partic-
ipants; (c) Since all transactions were encrypted, the
central server could not learn much information about
the individual transactions but could learn statistical
patterns on the number of requests from each identity.
8. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Registering a new device: Each cellular network can run
their own key verification service where the device can
generate its self-certifying key and initiate key-exchange
with a verifier of the cellular network. This scheme of
registering the user-generated public key on the cellu-
lar provider provides an expedited detection and mit-
igation strategy against network-level adversaries. In
the extreme scenario where the adversary breaks the
weak authentication, and spoofs the identity during first
connect, it has to generate a different self-certifying
key from the key generated by the device. Hence, the
provider obtains two conflicting keys for the same iden-
tity and revokes access accordingly.
Key Revocation: To provide better security with re-
spect to the key itself, we ensure that the reputation
of a user decays with time. A consequence of this is
that participants of the protocol need to regularly par-
ticipate in key-exchange to ensure liveness of the iden-
tity. On decay beneath a specific threshold, or on re-
peated blockage of interactions within an epoch, the
previously generated (and used) self-certifying keys are
revoked. A broadcast is sent to all associated users no-
tifying them of this event. Thus, these ephemeral keys
provide both forward and backward secrecy, as in the
worst-case, a compromised key will provide no informa-
tion about keys used prior, or to be used.
DDoS Alleviation: SMI messages coupled with exist-
ing text message traffic can increase the network load
on the cellular network. Enck et al. [28] suggest that
to disturb cellular service, efficiently blanketing only
a specific area with messages is sufficient so as to in-
crease the probability of successful disturbance. Sim-
ilar to the design of backoff protocols in wireless net-
works, SMI can use increasing delays in SMS messages
and message losses as early signals to reduce the rate
of messages from individual devices to reduce the net-
work load. One additional strategy discussed earlier is
to distribute the messages across the SMS and alternate
channels to further reduce cellular network load.
9. RELATED WORK
Despite the efforts of GSM to enhance their authenti-
cation security standards, many of the network security
threats of cellular networks continue to remain. Toorani
and Beheshti [62] outline many of the weaknesses in
the GSM authentication layer and propose simple fixes.
The GSM specifications team [15, 33] proposed new
cryptographic mechanisms to improve upon the early
algorithmic vulnerabilities that plagued the original 2G
authentication design. UMTS improved upon some of
the security threats of the earlier GSM specifications
to enhance integrity protection and authentication but
even these extensions had several security problems [48].
The LTE authentication mechanism [21] builds upon
the UMTS security model and introduces an key deriva-
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tion hierarchy to enhance the security of the pre-shared
keys; even these extensions suffered from several secu-
rity problems [21, 32, 63]. Han and Choi [32] demon-
strate a threat against the LTE handover key manage-
ment, involving a compromised base station. Tsay et
al. [63] find an attack on the UMTS and LTE AKA
protocols using an automated protocol analyzer based
on a computational model. Tang et al. [60] provide a
detailed analysis of the security properties and vulner-
abilities of different mobile authentication mechanisms.
Device pairing or key setup between two devices has
been extensively studied [17, 24, 1, 36, 42]. Specifically,
relevant to SMI, we describe a few important secure en-
counter protocols. SDDR [41] provides secure encoun-
ters whilst enabling secure communication, providing
selective linkability and silent revocation. SMILE [44]
is a mobile missed connections application, that estab-
lishes trust between individuals who have shared a prov-
able encounter. At the site of the encounter, MeetUp
[49] proposes a visual authentication scheme using a
trusted authority which attests a users public key to its
picture. Groupthink [52] provides security primitives
for users to count the number of participants and verify
Short Authentic Strings (SAS). Secure Location Shar-
ing (SLS) by Adams et al. [14], like SMI, uses multiple
communication channels along with contextual ques-
tion/answer protocols to prevent MitM attacks during
device pairing. With the proliferation of WiFi gadgets
and sensors that have susceptibility to different forms
of MitM attacks, researchers have explored lower-layer
signal abstractions to provide security over the wire-
less channel. Tamper-evident pairing (TEP) [30] is a
protocol that provides simple, secure WiFi pairing and
protects against MitM attacks without an out-of-band
channel. SMI is only built for phones or for devices ca-
pable of sending a text message. SMI differs from these
protocols in that it focuses establishing trust over the
cellular channel building upon the weak authentication
layer of GSM without heavy reliance on a PKI.
GAnGS [25] exchanges the public keys of group mem-
bers such that each member obtains the authentic pub-
lic key of the other. However, continuous physical prox-
imity is required. Moreover, the participant subgroup
size can be constrained. SPATE [43] relies on visual
channels and physical interactions. SPATE also re-
quires a number of steps involving potentially inatten-
tive end-users. SPATE was also designed for contact ex-
change in smaller groups (8 or fewer). Both GAnGS and
SPATE enable bystanders to learn contact information,
disclosing potentially sensitive private information. Our
ephemeral key-pairs and counter-based encryption pro-
tect meta-data and ensure forward and backward se-
crecy. SafeSlinger [29], provides a system that leverages
prior physical encounters to establish trust. The users
communicate to determine a correct sequence that is
common to all devices and select it to verify ephemeral
keys, preventing users from simply proceeding. Incorpo-
rating mandatory verification may sacrifice asynchrony
to ensure inattentive user resistance. Our system does
not necessitate any pre-cursive encounter with other
participants, and runs as a passive background process.
Keybase [5] ensures safe retrieval of a particular pub-
lic key using publicly readable social usernames. Each
external service is used to post a signature proving that
the account is bound to the named Keybase account.
Onename [7] offers a verified ”name” by registering a
blockchain ID. Keybase and Onename can be viewed
as independent third-party identity verifiers, which can
co-exist with the SMI protocol.
10. DISCUSSION
Independent of the results shown in §6, we stress that
the protocol functions in the absence of trusted loca-
tions/verifiers. The presence of these entities makes
the protocol converge faster due their intrinsic trust-
worthy nature. This presents an interesting trade-off to
be resolved by the end-user: Can we relax our minimal
trust assumptions for quicker usability? The answer is
also subject to the application that requires the trusted
identity; applications requiring immediate trust require
quicker convergence, while those that do not can permit
a relaxed rate of growth. We believe that the time re-
quired for convergence is acceptable; organizations such
as Google and Blockauth require similar timeframes to
authenticate identities. We would also like to stress on
the fact that most cellular providers in the USA (and
other countries) provide unlimited text-messaging fea-
ture. This ensures that the number of messages re-
quired is not a bottleneck. This protocol is suited to
work against a computationally and economically con-
strained network-level adversary with local scope; an
adversary with omniscient network knowledge can re-
peatedly thwart any attempt to successfully build rep-
utation and will hinder the progress of the protocol.
Mitigating such an adversary is not within the scope of
this work. For additional details not summarized in the
paper, refer to the full technical report [4].
11. CONCLUSIONS
Establishing secure identities in a decentralized man-
ner is a challenging research proposition. In the Internet
context, several decentralized solutions have been pro-
posed and yet few have actually been adopted. The
key takeaway from this paper is that SMI can aug-
ment weaker SIM security, building upon the very same
weak authentication layer of cellular networks. If SMI is
broadly adopted, we believe it has very important rami-
fications for building end-to-end secure applications for
mobile devices. We demonstrate these benefits using
sample applications and evaluation of the security prop-
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